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Abstract—Human-rated missions like those in NASA’s Orion 
Program continue to grow in complexity. The role of software in 
achieving ambitious mission objectives has expanded 
dramatically in the last few decades. Assuring the safety and 
performance of the embedded flight software is quickly growing 
beyond the reach of traditional methods and resource levels. The 
methods used to build these software-dominant systems evolve 
in an on-going attempt to keep pace with the scope of our 
ambitions. Agile software development is now commonplace. The 
long timelines and large batches of work associated with 
traditional methods are being replaced by rapid delivery of small 
increments – as system capabilities are realized in waves. 
Assurance of these critical software capabilities must therefore 
conquer an ever-expanding frontier of challenges, and do so with 
an approach matched to the evolving development methods. This 
paper recounts the journey of the Orion Independent Verification 
and Validation (IV&V) team as we addressed this dynamic 
environment. Widening our aperture to encompass a 
dramatically larger mission scope, while adjusting our cadence to 
synchronize with the rapid pace of agile software development, a 
new approach to IV&V is emerging. This approach is characterized 
by a sharper focus on mission capabilities, matched with a 
method to dynamically ‘follow the risk’ as the IV&V team delivers 
more compelling assurance data in waves. Traditional methods 
prevalent in IV&V tend to scope the work using artifacts of the 
development process as they evolve from preliminary to final 
versions, and the pace of delivery was synchronized with the 
development timelines prevalent in the waterfall lifecycle. That 
more static approach is out of phase with the demands of the new 
environment. Scoping work according to the critical capabilities of 
the system (rather than artifacts of development) and 
synchronizing with the rapid pace of agile development, we are 
moving toward more effective parity with the demands of the 
environment. We explain the concrete steps we took, the 
principles that motivated our choices, and the results we have 
achieved to date. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
NASA’s Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) 
Program plays a critical role for the highest profile missions 
within NASA’s portfolio. IV&V adds assurance that the 
safety- and mission-critical software will do what it is 
supposed to do, not do what it is not supposed to do, and 
respond appropriately under adverse conditions.  
The Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) is NASA’s 
next human-rated space craft, a capsule designed to take 
humans farther into space than ever before. Orion is being 
designed to return Astronauts to lunar orbit, explore 
asteroids, and even Mars. With mission profiles such as the 
ones mentioned, Orion is exceedingly complex in terms of 
software’s contribution to achieving mission objectives and 
that software is becoming more pervasive throughout the 
Orion systems. In addition, the software that resides on-board 
the Orion spacecraft is deemed human-rated safety-critical, 
thereby necessitating a broad scope of focus for the IV&V 
team’s assurance efforts. This complexity, pervasiveness, 
and criticality creates a resource challenge for everyone 
whose job is to add assurance that the mission is going to fly 
safely and successfully.  
The Orion flight software consists of over 800,000 lines of 
source code that is comprised of custom developed software, 
auto-generated software using multiple generators, and off-
the-shelf software.  This on-board software executes on a 
dozen processors with different architectures. In addition to 
the primary software, Orion is required to execute 
independently developed backup flight software due to the 
safety-critical nature of its operational objectives.  
Furthermore, Orion will be utilizing a real-time operating 
system which does not have the degree of flight heritage and 
data present on many other NASA missions.  These are a 
small set of the unique characteristics of the Orion software 
that introduce added complexity to the assurance role of the 
Orion IV&V team. Prior to flying humans on board Orion in 
Exploration Mission 2 (EM-2), Orion will undergo two 
separate test flights. The first of these, Exploration Flight Test 
1 (EFT-1), occurred in December 2014, launching Orion into 
a two-orbit flight to test various systems on board the vehicle. 
The second test flight will be EM-1, scheduled to launch in 
early 2020, which will send the Orion capsule to orbit the 
moon and spend close to three weeks in space. Orion’s 
extended time in space will provide an opportunity to test out 
the capsule prior to the launch of EM-2.  EM-2 will be a nine-
day mission taking Astronauts around the moon and back 
approximately three years after the launch of EM-1.  
As the software development for EM-1 matured, IV&V’s 
Orion team noticed the negative effects of trying to add 
assurance for such complex and pervasive flight software 
with its current staffing level. The challenges ranged from 
keeping up with the pace of the flight software developer’s 
agile development lifecycle to being unable to add assurance 
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for everything that had been identified as an area of concern. 
Traditionally, IV&V analyzes artifacts when they are 
received from the developer and delivers findings when the 
next group of artifacts are received or at major milestone 
events.  Using an agile development approach, Orion didn’t 
really have major milestone events and were incrementally 
developing the flight software over three years with new 
releases every three months.  IV&V has historically been 
more suited to more traditional software development 
approaches, tending to scope the work using artifacts of the 
development process as they evolve from preliminary to final 
versions. 
Orion’s development environment is very dynamic, like 
nothing IV&V had seen before.  The challenges were 
beginning to mount at a rate that was affecting the team’s 
attitude towards their work and their ability to do their job 
effectively. The team members were not able to perform 
analysis without frustration.  By the time the team members 
would review the artifacts and provide the analysis results to 
the developer, they had already either fixed the problem, or 
moved on to something very different and wouldn’t return to 
address our findings until a later release.  In many cases 
IV&V provided inputs months out of phase with the 
developer, which limits the effectiveness and impacts of the 
IV&V results.  The developer was doing what they needed to 
do to build the flight software, and it was evident that these 
challenges would require IV&V to adapt much more than 
usual to perform effective analysis.  
Orion IV&V needed to figure out how to operate moving 
forward. The IV&V team wasn’t going to suddenly get an 
influx of resources, and the flight software developer wasn’t 
going to slow down their aggressive development schedule. 
IV&V had to implement a change, something that would 
allow the Orion IV&V team to add assurance in the areas of 
highest risk to Orion flight software while at the same time 
allow flexibility to shift analysis focus rapidly if the areas of 
risk changed for whatever reason. The team needed a solution 
which would enable IV&V to continue to provide high value 
findings which could be identified early enough in the agile 
development lifecycle so that the developer could fix them at 
the appropriate time instead of fixing them in a later release 
increasing cost to an already resource constrained program.  
 
2. PIECES OF THE PUZZLE 
 
Follow-the-Risk Capability Based Assurance 
Money wasn’t falling from the sky. (It rarely, if ever, does.)  
The Orion IV&V team was set at its then-current level of 22 
analysts. It was evident that there was too much work for the 
Orion IV&V team to perform IV&V against each safety-
critical domain of the software, and Orion IV&V leadership 
had a sense that the team was wasting some of its effort on 
assuring relatively unimportant things due to the coarseness 
of its scoping approach which treated an entire domain of the 
software as either in-scope or out-of-scope.  As a result of 
those concerns, along with the fact that IV&V had never 
provided services to a project using an agile development 
lifecycle, several decisions had to be made regarding how to 
move forward. 
The first step began on a whiteboard in the summer of 2016. 
Orion IV&V leadership had been discussing ideas of how 
IV&V could make the biggest impact for the Orion Program 
with the analysts that were on the team. The team had lots of 
knowledge about the software capabilities that make up the 
Computer Software Configuration Items (CSCIs), or 
software entities, into which the Orion developers had 
organized the flight software because IV&V had been 
working on Orion for several years.  What the team did not 
have was as much understanding of the broader mission 
capabilities necessary to carry out the various portions of the 
EM-1 mission, and they tended to be stove-piped in their area 
of expertise. An idea emerged for how to focus the Orion 
IV&V resources to target the areas of highest risk within the 
safety and mission-critical software capabilities of Orion, 
allowing Orion IV&V analysts to dynamically “follow-the-
risk”.  These mission capabilities would represent how the 
vehicle is going to operate in the various phases of flight and 
would represent an integrated picture of how the various 
software domains would interact with each other to 
accomplish the mission capability. Figure 1 below details the 
nine step follow-the-risk process that was drawn on the 
whiteboard that day.  The next several paragraphs will walk 
you through the process in more detail.  
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Figure 1: Follow-the-risk diagram 
Following-the-risk begins with the analyst exploring the risk 
landscape in the area of the system or capability they would 
be analyzing, developing system understanding about that 
area of the system or capability, and identifying questions 
and/or concerns that they may have with the software based 
on the knowledge they have of how the software works and 
what kinds of things could go wrong, both software errors as 
well as adverse conditions that the software might experience 
during the mission.  
The parts of the software involved in these questions and 
concerns would become the specific areas where Orion 
IV&V would focus its assurance effort. The belief was that if 
Orion IV&V analysts could find evidence to support that the 
software either did or did not address these areas of questions 
or concern in a satisfactory manner, then IV&V would be 
providing value to the Orion Program by reducing 
uncertainty and therefore reducing risk. IV&V then defined 
what we call assurance objectives, which, when satisfied by 
evidence resulting from IV&V analysis focused on those 
areas of risk, would address the question or concern.  
The assurance objective would take on a pattern as the team 
began documenting them for each question or concern.  That 
pattern was: “Orion IV&V adds assurance that [noun][action 
verb] to mitigate the risk / to avoid [question/concern]”.  As 
one can see with this pattern, there could be multiple 
assurance objectives needed for certain software behaviors or 
capabilities.  The assurance objective represents the desired 
assurance conclusion that IV&V would like to be able to 
make at the completion of its analysis prior to the launch of 
EM-1. The bottom line is that the assurance objectives were 
written at a level of decomposition that it will be apparent 
what analytical evidence will need to be generated by the 
team members in order to satisfy them.   
Once the assurance objective has been determined and the 
focused area of analysis has been determined, the analyst 
needs to identify what evidence they need to produce to show 
that the assurance objective has been satisfied. Once this 
evidence is identified, the analyst needs to develop a plan for 
the analysis that needs to be performed in order to produce 
the desired evidence. This could range from requirements 
tracing to independent testing of the software implementation 
and everything in between; it is up to the discretion of the 
analyst to come up with a plan.  
The next step is where the analyst performs the analysis 
according to their plan. The primary goal for the analyst is to 
collect the aforementioned evidence needed to support the 
assurance objective. As the analysis is being performed, 
documents and code will be studied, issues can be discovered, 
and potentially new questions and concerns could arise 
resulting in new assurance objectives.  Analysis would be 
performed with the specific capability identified in the 
assurance objective at the forefront, meaning analysts would 
be looking for evidence to support the software’s ability to 
execute a specific capability.  This was a very different 
approach than IV&V was used to in the past. This capability 
based assurance approach would take IV&V away from a 
more traditional IV&V approach derived from the IEEE 1012 
Verification and Validation standard, to looking at artifacts 
and doing analysis with a specific mission capability, and the 
system and software capabilities that enable it, in mind. 
One immediate thought when it came to capability based 
assurance was that it would reduce the total number of 
findings that IV&V identifies.  Doing a more traditional 
technical framework approach exposes the analyst to an 
environment which can have many issues to be found, but the 
software defects found may not be as valuable as those 
specifically looking at a particular question or concern 
regarding a given mission capability. That’s not to say the 
traditional approach won’t work, it most definitely will work, 
it is that Orion IV&V didn’t have the resources to do such an 
approach with adequate coverage of all safety-critical aspects 
of the software, and had to produce the most value for the 
Orion Program with the resources at hand.   
No matter what the analyst discovers during their work, at the 
conclusion of the analysis, the evidence that they have found 
will be used to make an assurance conclusion.  An assurance 
conclusion is used to communicate the current assessment for 
the mission capability that was analyzed.  The assurance 
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conclusion conveys a level of confidence in the software’s 
ability to correctly execute the capability or mitigate the 
question or concern from occurring.  Ideally, the assurance 
conclusion is identical to the original assurance objective if 
there are no caveats or limitations on the evidence produced, 
but assurance conclusions can be caveated with various 
things if necessary.  If the software isn’t mature enough at a 
given point, or issues were found, this can all be 
communicated in an assurance conclusion.  The assurance 
conclusions which are developed are one of the primary 
products which IV&V provides various stakeholders.  
The process just described is the follow-the-risk process, but 
the process is not all completely new.  Some of the things 
described like exploring the risk landscape, identifying 
evidence needed to satisfy questions or concerns, and 
performing analysis are things that IV&V already does.  
What is new and makes follow-the-risk so valuable is being 
able to adjust our focus “on the fly” as we reduce risk in one 
area and move on to addressing risk in another area, or as new 
risks are identified that either didn’t exist or were not 
recognized previously.  Prior to this approach on Orion 
IV&V and currently on most projects at IV&V, risk is usually 
only assessed a couple of times a year at semi-annual 
planning events.  The risk levels that are determined as a 
result of those events are what drive the work over the entire 
year.  This type of static risk assessment approach didn’t 
seem to be appropriate for such a dynamic development 
environment as Orion’s.  Follow-the-risk would be a way that 
we could deal with such uncertainty moving forward, and 
adjust more easily to changes in the development 
environment.  
Making the transition to the follow-the-risk, capability based 
assurance approach became a multifaceted event. The idea of 
taking a large team of 22 analysts and radically changing the 
way they would approach analysis didn’t feel like the right 
thing to do at the time. The Orion IV&V leadership team 
discussed various options and determined that having a pilot 
team of select open-minded individuals would provide the 
best opportunity for success.  Using a small subset of the 
larger team would provide a low-risk option to try different 
approaches and learn quickly from mistakes in order to 
innovate the changes necessary to make this idea work. Once 
the pilot team felt comfortable in the approaches they were 
using, their ideas could then be communicated to the 
remainder of the team for implementation.   
The pilot team was assembled in August 2016 and consisted 
of four analysts of mixed backgrounds and experience. This 
pilot team was given freedom to experiment with capability 
based assurance and follow-the-risk concepts described 
earlier. The team would work together to explore these new 
concepts and test various ways to implement the ideas in the 
analysis they needed to perform. In order to have this freedom 
to explore, Orion IV&V leadership decided to stop analysis 
in the areas assigned to those four analysts. Leadership felt 
comfortable with this based on the fact that the software was 
in decent shape in their areas of expertise and that with the 
agile development approach that was being used, the software 
was going to be changing anyway, so IV&V felt that it could 
afford to skip looking at a single release of artifacts in those 
specific areas.  
The pilot team worked with Orion IV&V leadership, 
discussing challenges which they needed help overcoming as 
well as solutions that they had discovered along the way. 
After about a month of experimenting, the team was ready to 
implement some ideas they had on previous areas of analysis 
that they had performed.  The thought behind this was that 
the analyst could compare the new approach versus the 
previous approach they had used on those particular areas. 
The early results were very promising. The team performed 
the new analysis technique on previously analyzed 
documents in order to compare the results of their findings. 
Using capability based assurance the team found several very 
high severity issues that were missed during the application 
of the previous analysis approach because the mission 
capability was not being considered. The results spoke for 
themselves and in the eyes of the IV&V Program and Orion 
IV&V leadership, this was the type of analysis that the IV&V 
Program wanted to see more of in the future. Knowing that, 
the decision was made to transition the rest of the team to a 
follow-the-risk, capability based assurance approach.  
Turning the ship and getting the entire team to embrace these 
new concepts would be challenging. The Orion IV&V team 
was a large team spread across multiple locations and time 
zones composed of analysts with various levels of experience 
and backgrounds. This was not a unified front moving 
forward; the decision to transition to follow-the-risk, 
capability based assurance was met with some resistance, 
which was encouraged by Orion IV&V leadership. The 
dissenting opinions were how the Orion IV&V team was 
going to understand the potential weaknesses and pitfalls. 
The challenge was getting the team to adopt a growth mindset 
to help make it work. The results of this type of analysis were 
too promising to management, and the desire to make this 
type of shift in the type of analysis were too strong not to at 
least try this method. Not doing follow-the-risk, capability 
based assurance was not an option; the options were finding 
various ways that the team could tweak what the pilot team 
had learned into making it work for everyone and discovering 
things that the pilot team missed along the way. This type of 
thinking led to innovation that IV&V had been seeking for 
quite some time.  
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Starting the Transition 
Turning the team’s world upside down had to have a plan. 
The first step of transitioning the way IV&V was doing work 
to the new way which was desired by leadership was getting 
the remainder of the team on the same playing field as the 
pilot team. The rest of the team had seen what the pilot team 
had been doing, and had heard the results.  They needed an 
opportunity to experiment with the new approaches just like 
the pilot team had done. In order to implement capability 
based assurance and begin following-the-risk, it quickly 
became obvious that the team needed to define its assurance 
objectives before it could do much else. The remainder of the 
team were given approximately 10 weeks to study their 
respective areas of the Orion software, to explore the risk 
landscape and gain greater system understanding than they 
have ever had. This system understanding allowed the team 
to come up with all the questions and concerns they had 
regarding the software in that particular moment, with the 
knowledge they possessed.  Since the team already had a 
significant amount of knowledge and understanding of what 
things could be particularly risky, the assurance goal network 
was built from the bottom up.  This might seem 
counterintuitive to what a new project would do, identifying 
all the high level capabilities and then decomposing them.  
After some feedback from the team, they though it made the 
most sense taking their insight into what questions and 
concerns they had regarding critical mission capabilities and 
rolling them up to high level mission capabilities.  
From these questions and concerns the first set of nearly 300 
Orion assurance objectives were born. These assurance 
objectives were areas of concern that the team had deemed 
worthy enough to add assurance for, and provide their 
confidence in the flight software to the Orion Program based 
on the evidence they would collect. The timing of this action 
would take us through the end of the calendar year. January 
1, 2017 would mark a new time for IV&V, with the entire 
team ready to storm into action on their newly created 
assurance objectives.  This would also introduce the new 
vision for how IV&V would be conducted on Orion.  
Now that the team had defined the “what” they would be 
doing, they needed the opportunity to practice the “how”. The 
team was given the entire month of January 2017 to pick any 
assurance objective that was considered critical to the 
mission and to perform analysis with that specific capability 
in mind. This had never been done before by any analysts 
other than the pilot team, and was new territory for analysts 
of all levels of experience. The results were mixed after the 
first month; some analysts picked up on the concepts and 
execution of the new approach very quickly, often analysts 
who were relatively new to IV&V.   Other team members 
struggled with these new concepts, particularly some of the 
more experienced analysts who were acclimated to the 
traditional IV&V approach. It was up to the entire team to 
understand why analysts were struggling with the new 
concepts and help them along as we wanted “No Analyst Left 
Behind”.   
Another thing that some members of the team struggled with 
was the amount of freedom this approach provided them.  
Leadership was asking the team to take an adaptive approach 
to IV&V and to “do what makes sense and don’t do what 
doesn’t make sense”.  Previous approaches to IV&V did not 
encourage such freedom at the analyst level and the need for 
dynamic decision making.  Some analysts viewed it as a good 
thing that they had the opportunity to decide what to do, but 
others viewed the need to apply critical thinking to decision 
making as a bad thing; they appeared to prefer to be given 
specific direction as to what analysis to conduct rather than 
figure it out themselves. Still others were hesitant to exercise 
the freedom they were given, not fully believing at first that 
the previous constraints had really been released. 
The overall effort regarding these implementation challenges 
brought forth how important teamwork would be moving 
forward. No longer can analysts just go do analysis in a 
vacuum or stovepipe and depend on leadership to piece all of 
this analysis together to make a statement about the current 
state of the software. In this new way of approaching our 
work, this would be a team-first environment; the Orion 
IV&V team would succeed or fail as a team.  
 
Agile IV&V 
The word Agile has a dirty feel to it around the halls of NASA 
IV&V; it makes everything more challenging in the world of 
an IV&V analyst.  Agile had a different meaning to Orion 
IV&V leadership after working with a consultant from 
Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute.  
Mr. Will Hayes was hired by IV&V in the fall of 2016 to help 
the Orion IV&V project gain a better understanding of how 
Lockheed Martin, the Orion developer, was using Agile 
principles to develop Orion’s flight software for EM-1 so that 
Orion IV&V could execute its new follow-the-risk capability 
based approach. As Mr. Hayes dove deeper into what IV&V 
was attempting to do using and following-the-risk, he 
educated Orion IV&V leadership on the benefits that Agile 
and Lean principles could bring to what was looking to be 
accomplished.  
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Mr. Hayes has extensive experience in the implementation of 
Agile development methods at scale, including the method 
used by Lockheed Martin – the Scaled Agile Framework 
(SAFe). We initially engaged the Software Engineering 
Institute to help us understand Agile Software Development. 
This engagement evolved quickly to an application of these 
concepts to our own work.  Mr. Hayes took the Agile and 
Lean principles and put them in terms of assuring software 
instead of developing it. Out of this engagement there was a 
homework assignment which asked Orion IV&V leadership 
to write ourselves a “letter from the future” about what we 
wanted the team to look like six months from then.  Our 
response to the homework assignment became the foundation 
for the Orion IV&V vision which we would come to use as a 
guiding light for leadership.  This vision was communicated 
to the team in early January 2017.  It made sense to provide 
leadership’s vision to the team as they were transitioning to 
the new approaches described previously.  
 
The assurance objectives that the team was defining were like 
little projects on their own, and could be broken down even 
further into smaller pieces of work which could be 
accomplished during a Sprint cycle.  These smaller pieces of 
work are called “analysis activities” and describe the work 
that the analyst is planning on doing in order to gain the 
evidence needed for the assurance objective.  At this point it 
seemed clear that the best way to approach the new way 
Orion IV&V was choosing to do analysis was through the fast 
integrated learning cycles which Agile provided. If 
something wasn’t working, or something was working very 
well, this approach provided ample opportunity for the team 
to discuss the results and either course-correct or share the 
successes in order to help the other members on the team.  
At the same time as the transition to follow-the-risk, 
capability based assurance, Orion IV&V leadership decided 
the team would adopt a few select Agile and Lean principles, 
but only the ones that made sense to be used given the 
objectives and nature of IV&V. Agile IV&V was going to be 
the application of those relevant Agile and Lean principles in 
the planning, management, and performance of IV&V, not an 
orchestrated adoption of some branded framework or tool. 
Mr. Hayes’s next task was putting the finishing touches on 
the ideas of what Agile and Lean principles were viewed as 
relevant and developing the training for how they could be 
implemented in an assurance environment. Putting all three 
pieces of the puzzle together, it was determined that the entire 
team would make a formal shift to a follow-the-risk, 
capability based assurance Agile IV&V approach together as 
a team in early February 2017.   
Agile IV&V was a modified SAFe model which utilized 
Scrum based analysis, working within a Scrum team breaking 
the work down into small meaningful pieces.  Knowing that 
the team was currently too large to be a single Scrum team, 
we decided to create two self-organizing teams, each with 
their own Scrum Lead. Other aspects that seemed very 
valuable were setting up sprints and assurance releases. An 
assurance release is IV&V’s version of a development 
release, and would last 12 weeks and contain four 3-week 
sprints. The sprints within the assurance release provided the 
team an opportunity to take back control of what IV&V 
wanted to work on. The team would have the ability to work 
on whatever high priority assurance objectives they wanted 
to, as opposed to simply being reactive to the various 
documents the developer provided.  
The availability of software development artifacts can be a 
problem for a new project, but because the Orion Program 
had been going for almost ten years, there were plenty of 
artifacts available to support analysis, even if they were initial 
versions that were going to be updated.  Using a release and 
sprint structure also provided an opportunity to insert 
retrospectives. At the end of each sprint, the team would hold 
a retrospective to discuss what went well and what didn’t go 
well during that sprint. After the retrospective, the team 
would then plan the next sprint. At the assurance release 
level, the retrospectives were a time for all the scrum teams 
to stand down from work and bring everyone together to 
discuss how everything was going, to discuss what went well 
and what didn’t go well at the release level. These 
retrospectives also provided an opportunity to discuss things 
that the team thought needed to be changed, as well as dive 
deeper into the various analyses being used and how the team 
could improve upon them.   
Agile IV&V would also utilize the use of stand-ups, which 
would provide a daily status of each team member’s status to 
the Scrum Lead.  Typically a stand-up would last 15 – 20 
minutes and would focus on what work the analyst had 
completed since the last standup, what work they were 
planning on completing before the next standup, and what 
help did they need overcoming any challenges they may be 
having.  The Scrum Leads would then meet with Orion IV&V 
leadership in order to communicate up the status of how work 
was going.  These Scrum Lead level meetings not only 
allowed leadership to have insight into what work was 
occurring, it provided leadership an opportunity to efficiently 
communicate things to the team through the Scrum Leads 
without the need to schedule another team meeting.  
 
Assembling the Puzzle 
January had come and gone, and it was time to put all of these 
early action steps together and introduce our Agile IV&V 
principles. The first Assurance Release Planning meeting 
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would provide an opportunity for the rest of the team to be 
coached in the relevant agile principles that would comprise 
the Agile IV&V approach described previously. Over the 
course of three days with the majority of the team co-located 
in Fairmont, West Virginia, the Orion IV&V team had a new 
plan of attack. Two new Scrum teams, one focused on the 
Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) mission phase and one 
focused on mission-phase-independent “infrastructure” such 
as Command and Data Handling, Communications and 
Tracking, and Electrical Power, were formed and were 
trained by Mr. Hayes on how to execute all the new 
processes. During this first week, the teams used the 
knowledge they had just obtained and planned their first 
Assurance Release down to each sprint.  The team selected 
their work from the network of assurance objectives they had 
compiled as their backlog, starting with the highest priority 
assurance objectives.  From there the team was able to begin 
operating in this new regime, continuously improving along 
the way.  
The team learned lessons throughout the first 12-week 
Assurance Release and individuals adapted to the new ways 
of doing business.  Agile principles had never been applied 
to an IV&V project at NASA.  At first, everyone was very 
uncomfortable with the new processes – it took them out of 
their comfort zone.  This was something the team had to get 
used to - as a leadership team we recognized that when the 
team is uncomfortable, they need to pay attention because 
they are about to learn something new.  They needed to start 
getting comfortable with being uncomfortable.  
Whatever the challenge was, the team helped each other and 
continuously communicated through the process to help 
clarify any missing information that was needed.  In time, 
everyone adjusted to the new principles at different rates, 
which was expected given the dramatic changes that had been 
made.  Throughout the early months of the transition it was 
crucial that leadership exhibited patience through this 
learning curve. The challenges the team was facing from 
figuring everything out were great enough without leadership 
breathing down their necks.  The leadership team recognized 
that change is hard, change takes time, and we needed to have 
realistic expectations.  
Retrospectives were crucial to the team’s success early on, 
both at the sprint level and the Assurance Release level.  
These times provided an opportunity to discuss what was 
challenging for folks and to learn from others’ successes.  
Retrospectives are a way to highlight the fast integrated 
learning cycles that Agile IV&V offered the team.  Prior to 
holding an Assurance Release retrospective, team leadership 
solicited topics to discuss through one-on-one tag-ups with 
team members, as well as anonymous suggestions.  These 
topics, as well as other topics that leadership thought were 
important to discuss, would be the focus of the three-day 
retrospective events.  One thing that the retrospectives 
improved for Orion IV&V was the trust level among the 
team.  The team quickly realized through openly discussing 
what wasn’t going well publicly with the team, including 
leadership, without repercussions that they could trust each 
other.  The team wanted to help each other get better, and 
evidence of that demonstrated the trust that they had for each 
other allowing for greater conversation and problem solving 
at all levels of the team.  
One major adjustment came after the second assurance 
release, and was discussed at great length at the Assurance 
Release retrospective in early August 2017.  The team had 
spoken up and they wanted to move away from Scrum toward 
Kanban or Scrumban.  This suggestion was well thought out 
by the team; the team found it too difficult to break up the 
analysis activities into small enough pieces of work which 
could be consistently completed in three-week sprints.  It was 
also determined that there was no value in remaining in a 
Scrum mentality since people weren’t helping others 
complete their work once they had finished their own.  This 
was due in part to the specialized domain expertise needed to 
analyze certain assurance objectives in many areas. It wasn’t 
very efficient to have somebody who had little to no 
knowledge of what that person was working on to try to get 
up to speed and develop the system understanding in order to 
be able to help.  By the time the person would be ready to 
help, the other person will have just ended up completing the 
work. The team also tried a collaborative “gang-tackle” 
approach to working an assurance objective, which they 
found to be ineffective.   
Upon conclusion of the Assurance Release retrospective, the 
team had worked out the details of what would be a Scrumban 
approach, combining aspects of Scrum and Kanban.  What 
would be eliminated was the time boxing of the sprint cycles 
and most of the ceremonies that come with sprints.  
Everything else mostly remained and was viewed as 
valuable: the team still had retrospectives, stand-ups, and 
assurance releases. The work was still broken down into 
smaller analysis activities and the analysts remained in small 
teams. A couple of principles which were adopted from 
Kanban were the use of a Kanban board in JIRA, and work 
in progress (WIP) limits.  The introduction of the Kanban 
board in particular has been a tremendous improvement for 
the team.  Being able to see the board and understand what 
any given person is working on is great insight to have.  There 
were a few other things that were adopted along the way, 
most notably the use of a triage, which would help hold the 
team accountable to wrapping things up prior to the end of 
the assurance release.  The team highlighted successful 
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aspects of the new Scrumban approach at the following 
Assurance Release retrospective.    
Another struggle the teams had was operating as a self-
organizing team.  Leadership wanted to continue to foster 
growth in this area, so a third team was created, resulting in 
three smaller teams of 6-8 people.  Another change was that 
the Scrum Lead position was now a rotational position, with 
the responsibilities lasting no more than two Assurance 
Releases.  The thought process behind this was to give more 
people an opportunity to learn the position and gain some 
leadership experience, while continually promoting the idea 
of self-organization.  
 
Seeing the Results 
Since the transition to our follow-the-risk capability based 
agile approach in February 2017, the team continues to 
perform very well.  All levels of stakeholders, from NASA 
IV&V leadership up through NASA’s Office of Safety and 
Mission Assurance and the Orion Program are extremely 
impressed by the quality of the work that Orion IV&V is 
performing.  The Orion IV&V team is continually being used 
as examples of excellence within the IV&V Program. The 
praise in their performance is not only coming from internal 
sources. Quotes from Orion Program personnel have also 
been coming into the IV&V Program through customer 
satisfaction surveys. One such quote: “IV&V's capability 
based approach and "follow-the-risk" strategy allows them to 
have relevant opinions on the most difficult issues the 
program is facing. Their recommendations and conclusions 
are well researched and obviously vetted internally. They 
consistently bring coherent communication and clarity to 
discussion and I highly value their opinion”. Another quote 
from a member of the Orion Program: “I think IV&V has 
incredibly increased their value by going to this approach”.  
So how have we increased IV&V’s value that is being 
provided to our stakeholders?  By delivering impactful issues 
to the developer helping them identify deficiencies in their 
requirements, design, code, or testing with respect to critical 
capabilities for the Orion spacecraft.  IV&V has seen the rate 
of the highest severity issues double in one year, while the 
overall rate of issue discovery has decreased. What that data 
supports is that the Orion IV&V program is not inundating 
the developer with low impact software defects and trivial 
issues, but is delivering evidence-based risk-driven critical 
issues that the Orion Program may not have otherwise found.  
Another aspect of value that the IV&V team is adding is one 
of positive assurance. Previously there wasn’t an effective 
method of communicating the “goodness” of the software, as 
most communication was focused on the issues and risks 
associated with what IV&V had analyzed.  Since Orion 
IV&V has made the change to our new approach, we have 
been providing not only negative findings (issues and risks) 
but also positive findings, assurance conclusions that confirm 
the flight software’s ability to do what it is supposed to do, 
not do what it is not supposed to do, and respond 
appropriately under adverse conditions. This provides a more 
balanced assessment of the condition of the software than 
simply providing the negative findings as in the past.  
IV&V’s assurance conclusions provide all of our 
stakeholders insight into IV&V’s confidence in the software.  
Having this type of insight allows decision makers to 
understand the level of risk perceived by an independent 
outside entity.  
We are also able to deliver our assurance conclusions, issues, 
and risks at a much faster cadence.  Under the old approach 
it was noted that IV&V was delivering products months out 
of phase with the developer.  Since the changes have been 
made we have improved our delivery cadence from months 
to weeks, becoming more in sync with the developer which 
is crucial to make IV&V worth the investment when dealing 
with a project using agile development methods.   
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, the Orion IV&V team has seen a tremendous 
amount of value-added change in a short time span. This 
change was not always easy at times, but the amount of 
growth which occurred for all members of this team was 
tremendous. The IV&V Program believes that the changes 
that the Orion IV&V team have implemented is a step 
towards the future of IV&V at NASA. In time it is hopeful 
that the Orion IV&V team will be able to learn from others 
who attempt a similar type of analysis approach.  
If a project you are working on is either struggling with 
something, or is undergoing change, think about the benefits 
that agile principles could provide you. One of the primary 
benefits that can be provided is increased communication 
across the team. There are great advantages to having 
frequent communication at the worker level about how things 
are going and how to make them better. This type of 
communication also can provide great insight into the day-to-
day operations for leadership. An agile approach also helps 
with accountability and planning for responsibilities, things 
that most projects could benefit from if they don’t already 
have that in place.  
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The approaches in this paper worked for the Orion IV&V 
team after many adjustments along the way. What was 
described was one way of doing things, not the right way or 
the only way.  It was the response of a team with numerous 
challenges, from agile developed safety critical software, to 
not knowing how all of the areas of risk were going to be 
addressed.  Think about the challenges your team is facing 
and embrace that feeling of being uncomfortable.  Challenge 
your team to find a solution that works for everyone to get 
the results that the customer is seeking. 
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